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Abstract 
The mis-evaluation of risk in securitized financial products is central to understanding the 
global financial crisis. This paper characterizes the evolution of risk factors affecting 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on subprime mortgages. A key feature of 
subprime mortgage-backed indices is that they are distinct in their vintage of issuance. 
Using a latent factor framework that incorporates this vintage effect, we show the 
increasing importance of common factors on more senior tranches during the crisis. An 
innovation of the paper is that we use the unbalanced panel structure of the data to 
identify the vintage, credit, common and idiosyncratic effects from a state-space 
specification. 
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1 Introduction
A consensus is emerging that securities based on subprime mortgages played a
central role in the evolution of the Financial Crisis of 2008. Falling real estate
prices and the resulting deliquencies on mortgages sparked turmoil in nancial
markets as participants began to realize the shortcomings of their pricing mod-
els. Financial market participants subsequently had di¢ culties estimating the
values of securities relating to subprime mortgages and di¢ culties trading them.
The spread of this crisis from a relatively small sector of the nancial system
across markets and international borders resulted in widespread nancial dis-
tress.1 Among other e¤ects, banking in much of the world su¤ered substantial
losses followed by serious retrenchment and restructuring. The turbulence and
ensuing lack of condence spread to other asset markets and the real economy.
Brunnermeier (2009) and Dwyer and Tkac (2009) among others document the
evolution and spread of the crisis.
The crisis emerged after a period of unprecedented growth in structured -
nancial products and the extensive creation of subprime-mortgage asset-backed
securities. Figure 1 highlights the growth in this sector from 1995 to 2007.2
These products were tranched and rated before being sold to investors in much of
the world. Among others, DeMarzo (2005) provides a rationale for the issuance
of pooled and tranched securities by informed sellers who enjoy an informational
advantage regarding the quality of the asset. Although pooling alone may re-
duce value, the combination of pooling and tranching can be value enhancing
due to the transformation of risk through tranching. Furthermore, this e¤ect
increases with the size of the underlying pool of assets. DeMarzo suggests that
asymmetric information is the friction most consistent with the emergence and
success of the CDO market. Whatever the underlying reason, as the creation of
CDOs generated prots, there was an increased demand for underlying assets
which could be included in a pool, a feature most clearly observed in growth in
the market for subprime mortgages. Whether due to CDOs or increased demand
for the related assets by the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, Mian and Su (2009) provide strong evidence that less stringent
mortgage criteria and increased levels of securitization became increasingly im-
portant for subprime mortgages in less a­ uent geographical areas in the U.S.
They also provide evidence consistent with the demand for securitized products
contributing to the growth of such mortgages. Likewise, Benmelech and Dlugosz
(2009) show that investor demand was important for the growth of CDOs and
similar tranched products.
The mis-perception and mis-evaluation of risk in many of these structured
nancial products is central to explanations of the nancial crisis. Some market
participants equated the risk of AAA-rated tranches to the risk of AAA-rated
corporate bonds and failed to take account of the very di¤erent risks of the
1Dwyer and Tkac (2009) estimate that subprime mortgages are no more than one percent
of global bond values, stock values and bank deposits.
2Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) document a range of potential explanantions for the
rapid expansion of subprime mortgage originations.
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two assets. Such mis-evaluation may have a¤ected valuations. In addition to
possible mispricing, the valuation of CDO tranches is particularly problematic
in the event of widespread defaults (Smithson 2009), a feature not apparent be-
fore defaults increased in 2007. Valuation models have four key inputs: default
rates, prepayment risk, recovery rates and asset default correlations. Problems
estimating the last two of these were important aspects of the nancial crisis.
Default correlations inevitably are based on historical data, which led to their
underestimation based on data which reected increasing house prices and eco-
nomic expansion. As default correlations increase, the probability of observing
large-scale defaults that a¤ect senior tranches of CDOs increases and their prices
fall. Estimates of recovery rates were also a¤ected. Consequently, the risk priced
in the di¤erent CDO tranches was under-estimated (Coval, Jurek and Sta¤ord,
2009), and its realization amplied the downward pressure on tranche prices.
Coval, Jubek and Sta¤ord (2009) analyze the risk inherent in the securitization
process and in particular how risk is transferred between tranches in the event
of increasing importance of a large common factor such as falling housing prices.
A better understanding of the factors underlying price changes in these
subprime-mortgage backed assets is important for understanding their role in
the crisis. The aim of this paper is to characterize the driving forces behind
the decreases in the prices of collateralized debt oblitations (CDOs) based on
subprime mortgages and the factors associated with these decreases. Our ap-
proach extends Longsta¤ and Rajans (2008) empirical model. They show how
a pricing model for CDOs can be represented as a three factor model, with the
factors representing the credit rating of the asset, a global factor and an idiosyn-
cratic factor. Their work is applied to pricing tranches of the CDX index, which
is compiled from the credit derivatives of 125 single-name corporate entities.
Using data for October 2003 to October 2005, they estimate that idiosyncratic
default risk and common events account for roughly 65 percent and 8 percent
of the CDX risk premium respectively. In an application to the more recent
period, Bhansali, Gringrich and Longsta¤ (2008) show a substantial increase in
common-event risk occurring in 2007 and 2008.
The CDOs used in this paper are credit derivatives based on subprime mort-
gages. The subprime mortgage-backed indices are distinct in their vintage of
issuance as well as other dimensions. Thus, the empirical model of Longsta¤and
Rajan (2008) is extended to include an additional factor representing vintage
e¤ects.3 The model is applied to returns data for three di¤erent asset tranches
(AAA, AA and BBB-) of mortgage backed securities using the Markit ABX.HE
indices for three vintages of issuance over the period January 2006 to April 2009.
Fender and Scheicher (2009) estimate the relationship between returns on these
indices; Mizrach (2009) documents their jump behaviour.
Our results show the distinct characteristics of the tranches in terms of the
four factors. First, in 2006, all factors have a discernible role in the returns of
3Loan level analysis of the subprime market in Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) also
supports for the inclusion of a vintage factor. After controlling for a variety of borrower,
lender and macroeconomic conditions, they nd strong empirical support for a gradual and
persistent deterioration of loan quality from 2001 to 2007.
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the assets. Second, the common factor becomes important when the nancial
turmoil begins, with its e¤ect on AAA tranches of various vintages increasing
over time. The common factor overwhelms the vintage and ratings factors for
all but the equity tranche during the high-volatility period of July 2007 onward.
Third, the higher risk BBB- tranche is a¤ected less by the common factor but
shows a great deal of exposure to the idiosyncratic factor and, in later vintages,
both credit rating and vintage factors. Finally, intermediate tranches display
the greatest mixture of risk exposures, with all of the factors contributing to
the variation of returns.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the ABX data
and highlights its unique features which are accommodated in our econometric
model. Section 3 presents the econometric set up and describes our Kalman
lter approach to estimating the factor model. Section 4 presents and discusses
our results, while section 5 contains our concluding remarks.
2 Data
The price decreases in asset backed securities during the nancial di¢ culties
from 2007 to 2009 are dramatic. These declines are associated with declines
in the values of the underlying assets but also seem to represent a signicant
reassessment of the risks of such assets. We analyze the risk factors inherent
in these tranched pools by examining the relatively new indices of values of
CDOs used as the basis for Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) related to subprime-
mortgage-backed securities. These indices, entitled ABX.HE, are produced by
Markit and were rst introduced in January 2006.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the indices from January 2006 to April 30,
2009. Financial market participants use ABX.HE indexes to track the subprime-
mortgage market. Each index is represented by ve di¤erent tranches, varying
from AAA to BBB-, where the ratings are based on those from Moodys and
S&P, with the lower of the two ratings taken when both are available and dif-
ferent. The index values are based on underlying credit default swaps, with
the insurance coupon set so that the index trades at par 100 unless such a
coupon would exceed 500 basis points. Fender and Scheicher (2008) represent
each indexs value as
100 + PV(coupons) - PV(writedowns, shortfalls).
In this representation, deviations below 100 indicate that the present value of
the coupon payments for insurance are less than the expected value of losses.
Each vintage of the index is based on twenty mortgage-backed CDO deals
with tranches covering all of the credit ratings over the prior six month period,
For example, the ABX.HE 06-1 index is constructed from deals created in the
second half of 2005. The issuers are the largest originators.4 There are strict
4Licensed Dealers in the ABX.HE indices include the following: ABN AMRO; Bank of
America; Barclays Capital; Bear Stearns; BNP Paribas; Calyon; Citigroup; Credit Suisse;
3
requirements that must be met by the deals to qualify for inclusion in the
construction of the index. For example, the value of each deal must be at least
$500 million and each tranche must have an average life of between four and
six years, except for the AAA tranche, which must have a weighted average life
greater than ve years. Furthermore, no loan originator can have more than
four deals included.
These indices are rolledevery six months with indices commencing in Jan-
uary 2006, July 2006, January 2007 and July 2007. There have been no further
rolls due to an insu¢ cient number of new CDOs meeting the eligibility require-
ments.5 These rolls were designed to provide a current index reecting securities
recently created that are likely to be the most traded ones. However, these four
indices are not suitable for splicing between issuances to create a continuous se-
ries on the most recent CDOs, as done in Longsta¤ and Rajan (2008) for CDX
data. Figure 1 suggests substantial vintage e¤ects that would distort any analy-
sis based on a spliced series. Instead, each new roll is best viewed as a unique
vintage with the risk of the reference portfolio of CDSs likely to change between
rolls. The set of underlying loans for each vintage reects mortgages created
in market conditions in the preceding six months and represent quite di¤erent
risks in this time period. The coupon rates for insurance on these ABX indices
increased from 2006 to 2007. These increasing coupon rates for insurance are
evidence of increases in the perceived risk even at origination.
Table 1 shows the weakening degree of comovement of the assets across vin-
tages. These correlations show quite di¤erent relationships between the tranches
over time and suggest that each vintage is better viewed as a unique asset, rather
than the most recent vintage being the best indicator of the current value of
the same security. Interestingly, the most senior (AAA & AA) and most junior
claims (BBB & BBB-) exhibit the largest levels of comovement.
This paper explicitly analyzes tranches from three of the vintages across
three credit ratings. We omit the vintage issued in June 2006 because it be-
haves similarly to the rst vintage and leaving it out reduces dimensionality
problems in our econometric model. The three credit ratings selected AAA,
AA and BBB- span the range of ratings again without unnecessarily increas-
ing the dimensionality of our estimation. We use daily returnsof each series,
where returns are computed as the di¤erence in log index values. Our analysis
covers the period from January 19, 2006 to April 30, 2009. Figure ?? plots
the data. As explained above, the data set is unbalanced. All vintages exist
at the end of the period, but the vintages arrive progressively. This feature is
captured by the use of dummy variables in the modelling framework. Table 2
presents some summary statistics for the index values. Within each vintage,
the standard deviation of return is inversely related to the credit rating of the
Deutsche Bank; Goldman Sachs; JPMorgan; Lehman Brothers; Merrill Lynch; Morgan Stan-
ley; RBS Greenwich; UBS; and Wachovia.
5As of this writing in 2010, there has been very little securitization since 2008.
4
Table 1:
Correlation coe¢ cients between assets of di¤erent credit ratings within
Vintages.
06_1 Vintage 06_2 Vintage 07_1 Vintage 07_2 Vintage
Corr(AAA,AA) 0.842 0.695 0.644 0.683
Corr(AAA,A) 0.547 0.460 0.348 0.454
Corr(AAA,BBB) 0.426 0.294 0.312 0.326
Corr(AAA,BBB-) 0.443 0.258 0.323 0.273
Corr(AA,A) 0.684 0.658 0.580 0.664
Corr(AA,BBB) 0.482 0.463 0.436 0.492
Corr(AA,BBB-) 0.501 0.407 0.402 0.438
Corr(A,BBB) 0.678 0.635 0.538 0.480
Corr(A,BBB-) 0.638 0.532 0.492 0.454
Corr(BBB,BBB-) 0.852 0.787 0.861 0.824
asset. Across vintages, the standard deviation increases with the most recent
vintage displaying the highest volatility. Consistent with most asset return data,
the distributions are negatively skewed with the absolute value of the minimum
return greater than its corresponding maximum. Within vintages, AAA-rated
tranches exhibit the highest levels of excess kurtosis but kurtosis declines across
vintages. This may suggest that AAA securities experienced the most serious
revision in the crisis.
3 Modelling framework for ABX data
Longsta¤ and Rajan (2008) and Bhansali, Gringrich and Longsta¤ (2008) treat
the asset backed securities data as a continuous stream from a homogenous
asset. In particular, asset backed securities of this type are issued at regular
time intervals, with the intent that there is a continuous market with positions
rolled over from one contract to others, as well as a continued secondary market
for older vintages of issue. In this way, these securities resemble on-the-run and
o¤-the-run bonds markets as opposed to futures contracts which expire. These
authors deal with the need for a continuous stream of data to represent prices
or returns in this market by simply splicing the data together at a point in time.
It seems to make little di¤erence in the non-crisis period they cover. However,
one of the dening features of the asset backed securities markets during our
period is a perception that the underlying assets were declining in quality. From
Figure 2, it is clear that the behavior of the price declines in these assets, as
the nancial di¢ culties from July 2007 to 2009 unfold, di¤ers for each tranche.
Much interesting information would be lost by splicing to form a single series
for each tranche.
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Table 2:
Summary statistics for assets by Vintage.
Mean Std Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis No. obs
Vintage 06-1
AAA -0.00046 0.0088 -0.082 0.076 -1.137 24.426 822
AA -0.00217 0.0175 -0.140 0.115 -1.237 16.157 822
BBB- -0.00391 0.0212 -0.187 0.112 -1.818 13.247 822
Vintage 07-1
AAA -0.00066 0.0106 -0.082 0.076 -0.893 16.071 571
AA -0.00313 0.0209 -0.140 0.115 -0.904 10.343 571
BBB- -0.00563 0.0252 -0.187 0.112 -1.350 8.283 571
Vintage 07-2
AAA -0.00082 0.0120 -0.082 0.076 -0.751 11.928 445
AA -0.00396 0.0236 -0.140 0.116 -0.702 7.446 445
BBB- -0.00650 0.0276 -0.187 0.112 -1.208 6.826 445
In this paper, we extend the analysis on asset backed securities to exploit
information on the credit rating of the asset, the common and idiosyncratic
characteristics as in Longsta¤ and Rajan (2008) and also incorporate the infor-
mation pertaining to the vintage of the issuance. The global, rating and vintage
factors are all expected to be important in dealing with mortgage-backed se-
curities, as these are more susceptible to economic conditions compared with
single-name credit derivatives. The unbalanced nature of our dataset and the
explicit di¤erences in ratings allows us to identify these factors from the char-
acteristics of the data rather than merely applying supposed labels to factors
ex-post.
We propose a latent factor model for returns, such as for example in Dungey
and Martin (2007), where, yi;j;t represents the return, at time t, of an asset-
backed security of vintage i (with the vintage being the date of issuance of the
security) and credit rating j. The returns are modelled as a linear combina-
tion of responses to shocks common to all assets in the dataset, wt; a vintage
factor representing the vintage to which a return belongs, vi;t; a ratings factor
representing the rating of the tranche, kj;t; and idiosyncratic shocks, fi;j;t: This
linear model is similar to that resulting from the theoretical set up in Longsta¤
and Rajan (2008)6 and can be expressed as:
yi;j;t = 0 + i;jwt + i;jvi;t + 'i;jkj;t + i;jfi;j;t: (1)
To capture serial correlation in the data, factors are modelled as autore-
gressive processes. We estimate AR(1) processes for the common, ratings and
vintage factors. In line with evidence from previous research on factor models
(Dungey et al. 2000), we do not estimate persistence in the idiosyncratic shocks.
6Note that although Longsta¤ and Rajan (2008) test their three factor model against
reduction to a two or one factor model, they do not consider expansion to further factors.
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The full specication of the model can be written
wt = wwt 1 + w;t (2)
vi;t = v;ivi;t 1 + v;i;t (3)
kj;t = k;jkj;t 1 + k;j;t (4)
fi;j;t = i;j;t (5)
m;n;t  N(0; 1) for all m;n (6)
It is clear from the data that the conditional variances of our asset returns vary
over time and we account for this feature of the data. Since our model is already
heavily parameterized, we cannot accommodate an ARCH specication directly
into the setup. Instead, we pre-lter the returns by estimating an IGARCH(1,1)
model and use the standardized returns in the factor model.7
This framework can be conveniently rewritten in state-space form as
Yt = Zt + S"t (7)
t+1 = t +Rut (8)
where Yt is the vector of the returns in each asset, E["t] = 0; E["t"0t] = H;E[ut] =
0; and E[utu0t] = Q. The evolving latent factors are contained in the vector t
and the idiosyncratic factors, fi;j;t are contained in the vector "t. The identity of
the Kalman lter and the factor model can be seen by the following denitions
of the matrices for the 3 vintages and 3 asset ratings case:
Z =
26666666666664
1;AAA 1;AAA 0 0 '1;AAA 0 0
1;AA 1;AA 0 0 0 '1;AA 0
1;BBB 1;BBB 0 0 0 0 '1;BBB
2;AAA 0 2;AAA 0 '2;AAA 0 0
2;AA 0 2;AA 0 0 '2;AA 0
2;BBB 0 2;BBB 0 0 0 '2;BBB
3;AAA 0 0 3;AAA '3;AAA 0 0
3;AA 0 0 3;AA 0 '3;AA 0
3;BBB 0 0 3;BBB 0 0 '3;BBB
37777777777775
(9)
t =
2666666664
wt
v1;t
v2;t
v3;t
kAAA;t
kAA;t
kBBB;t
3777777775
. (10)
Dening  as a 7 7 diagonal matrix of the autoregressive parameters,  = [w
v;i k;j ] for all i; j, St as a 9 9 matrix with the parameters i;j on the main
7Preltering the data may result in some ine¢ ciencies in the second stage of estimation.
However, the consistency of our estimates is una¤ected. We adopt a univariate ltering
approach in common with much of the existing literature.
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diagonal, and R is the appropriately sized identity matrix where the variances of
the factors are standardized to one, we can estimate the parameters by the stan-
dard Kalman lter procedure.8 The standard Kalman lter prediction equations
are given by
at+1 = atjt (11)
Ptjt+1 = Ptjt0 + SQS0 (12)
where Ptjt+1 is the prediction vector. The updating equations are given by
atjt = at + PtZ 0F
 1
t vt (13)
Ptjt = Pt   PtZ 0F 1t ZP 0t (14)
where
vt = Yt   Zt (15)
Ft = ZPtZ
0 + Z: (16)
Furthermore, we accommodate the unbalanced nature of our data by construct-
ing a dummy matrix, Dt, as follows;
Dt =
26666666666664
1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1
d1t 0 d1t 0 d1t 0 0
d1t 0 d1t 0 0 d1t 0
d1t 0 d1t 0 0 0 d1t
d2t 0 0 d2t d2t 0 0
d2t 0 0 d2t 0 d2t 0
d2t 0 0 d2t 0 0 d2t
37777777777775
(17)
where d1t takes the value of 1 from the initiation of the 07-1 vintage onwards
and 0 otherwise and d2t is similarly dened with respect to the vintage 07-
2. The Kalman lter equations are then modied by replacing Z with Z  Dt
wherever it appears in the lter with the operator  indicating element-by-
element multiplication.
4 Results
Figures 3-5 succinctly summarize the results of estimating the model. The
parameter values themselves are consistent, but not very informative.9 Instead,
for each vintage, we present the squared standardized returns in the rst panel
and subsequent panels show how much of the movement in this return is due to
8Starting values are taken as the consistent estimates of the parameters of the factor model
in equation (1) obtained from unconditional moments using GMM.
9Parameter values are available from the authors upon request.
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a common factor, a vintage factor, a ratings factor and an idiosyncratic factor
respectively. Thus, in the rst column of Figure 3, the top panel presents the
standardized returns. The panels underneath show that in the early part of the
sample the ratings factor was an important contributor to the returns for this
asset, but that from mid-2007 onwards the common factor plays a much larger
role. Vintage and idiosyncratic factors are less important for the AAA:06_1
tranche; they play a more important role in lower ranked tranches. There is
su¢ cient time variation and volatility in each factor to justify its inclusion in
our estimated model. We discuss each of the factors in turn before delving more
deeply into the sources of the common factor.
4.1 The common factor
Looking across the asset vintages in Figures 3 to 5, it is apparent that the role of
the common factor is increasingly important over time. In all cases, the inuence
of the common factor is negligible during the relatively tranquil conditions that
characterized the nancial system before July 2007. The limited role for this
risk source is consistent with default correlations being relatively low during this
period as are the low credit default spreads demanded for protection against
default of the pooled assets. For example, the spread for the AAA tranche of
the 06-1 vintage was a mere 18 basis points, falling even further to 9 bps for
the 07-1 vintage and nally increasing to 76 bps in the last vintage 07-2. It
is plausible that the low realization of the common shock, more than anything
else, contributed to the under-estimation of risk by credit rating agencies and
some market participants. Brennan, Hein and Poon (2009) show that if investors
relied exclusively on credit rating agencies to accurately assess creditworthiness,
this can lead to mispricing of CDOs(and similar products) tranches. Classens
et al. (2010) argue that many investors actually did rely totally on credit ratings.
As the crisis emerges in mid-2007, the role of the common shock in con-
tributing to asset volatility increases noticeably. The pervasive nature of the
systematic downturn a¤ects all assets in the underlying pool and thus heightens
the pairwise correlation of those assets. The results show that the AAA-rated
assets are the most vulnerable to common shocks, consistent with the argument
of Coval, Jubek and Sta¤ord (2009) that an amplied common shock e¤ectively
transfers risk from lower to more senior tranches. From mid-2007 onwards, the
common factor swamps all other factors in determining the volatility of the most
senior tranches. The other factors are unimportant, suggesting that all AAA-
rated assets increasingly behaved similarly without any distinguishing vintage
e¤ects. The increasing levels of comovement in the underlying pool of assets
quickly eroded the bu¤er protecting the AAA tranche and in relative terms
implies investors in these assets were worst hit by the common shock.
A number of other studies document a similar pattern for systematic shocks
in di¤erent asset markets. Eichengreen et al. (2009) use a principal compo-
nents analysis on the CDS spreads of 45 international nancial institutions and
document an increasing role for a common factor as the nancial crisis evolves,
with its largest inuence in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse. Similarly,
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Longsta¤and Myers (2009) show that a common factor can explain a substantial
proportion of bank and CDO equity return variation.
4.2 Ratings and vintage factors
Both the rating and vintage factors exert a time-varying inuence on asset
return variability in the results. At various times in the life of these subprime-
mortgage backed assets, the specic rating and vintage helped to di¤erentiate
between assets. For the earliest vintage, 06-1, ratings matter and this factor
accounts for a non-trivial amount of asset return variability. For later vintages,
ratings matter little, probably due to the increasing importance of the common
shock. The vintage factor behaves in a less systematic manner. Its most striking
role appears in the BBB- rated tranche of the July 2007 vintage, for which it
exerts a large inuence. Clearly, it is bad news to be a BBB- rated tranche of
a CDO based on subprime mortgages that originated in the rst half of 2007.
Overall, rating and vintage play a more limited role in determining asset
returns than the common and idiosyncratic factors. There is su¢ cient evidence,
however, to show that the rating and vintage factors a¤ected returns and that
the time-varying nature of their e¤ects is captured by our modelling approach.
These two factors are more important during the non-crisis period before July
2007, but their role from July 2007 on is overwhelmed by the common shock.
4.3 The idiosyncratic factor
Just as the common factor exerted the greatest inuence upon the most senior
claim, idiosyncratic shocks have their greatest e¤ect at the other end of the
rating spectrum. In the earliest vintage, idiosyncratic risk exclusively a¤ects
the BBB- rated tranche. Idiosyncratic shocks held little danger for holders of
more senior claims of this vintage as the BBB- and equity tranches absorbed
them. In later vintages, there is a greater role for idiosyncratic shocks as other
mezzanine tranches also exhibit some vulnerability to it. In this case the equity
bu¤er is not su¢ cient to prevent losses from moving into higher rated tranches.
Finally, in the vintage initiated at almost the same time as the escalation of a
subprime mess into the beginnings of a full-scale nancial crisis, the e¤ects of
idiosyncratic risk are quite disparate and much less than on earlier CDO deals.
Again this reects the overwhelming inuence of the common shock which left
little scope for the idiosyncratic risk inuence. It may also reect a lack of
trades when the value of the BBB- tranche attened out near zero.10
The behavior of the idiosyncratic shock is consistent with the arguments
outlined earlier. In normal market conditions, when assets in the underlying
pool exhibited relatively low correlation, idiosyncratic risk resulted in a few
random subprime mortgage defaults whose e¤ects were absorbed by the equity
tranche or other lower rated tranches. The onset of the crisis in July 2007 led
10The buyer of insurance in the CDS on the CDO makes an initial payment to the insurance
seller equal to the the di¤erence between 100 and and the index value. When the index is
near zero, this becomes a substantial unsecured loan.
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to this risk source being swamped by the common shock, limiting its impact on
asset return volatility.
4.4 What drives the factors?
Although latent factors extract both observed and unobserved sources of com-
monality across the assets, it can be informative to examine how the factors
correlate with a number of observed variables associated with the nancial tur-
moil. The relationships with observed variables is likely to be informative about
the driving forces behind the factors and possibly informative about the extent
to which unobserved forces such as changes in investor perception are impor-
tant. The weekly averages of the unobserved factors obtained from the Kalman
lter estimation presented in Figure 6.11
Section 4.1 showed that the common factor plays a major part in the in-
creasing risk prole of the most senior tranches of subprime mortgage backed
assets. Since AAA tranches constitute the majority of many CDOs, we examine
the main drivers of this risk source.12 The common factor exhibits a substan-
tial increase in volatility when the nancial turmoil begins. This reects the
deterioration in mortgagescredit quality as housing prices fell. For example,
the houses underlying the mortgage pool in the 07-2 indices fell into negative
equity sooner than earlier originated mortgages, which beneted from increases
in real estate prices in 2005 and 2006.
Observable economic variables that are related to the deterioration of the
ABX are proxies for real estate prices, liquidity, counterparty risk and general
nancial market volatility. We use a daily price index for the U.S. real estate
trusts (REITs) to reect news about housing prices. Liquidity and counterparty
default risk are measured by two 3-month interest rate spreads: the spread be-
tween the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and the overnight in-
dexed swap rate (OIS); and the spread between the OIS rate and the U.S.
Treasury Bill rate. The LIBOR-OIS spread can be viewed as representing coun-
terparty risk from the standpoint of a lender to another institution. This spread
also can be viewed as representing liquidity from the perspective of borrowers
who believe they are not risky counterparties. The TED spread - the spread
between LIBOR and the Treasury Bill rate - is the other common measure of liq-
uidity and counterparty risk and would be partly redundant with the inclusion
of the LIBOR-OIS spread. Instead of the TED spread, we include the spread
between OIS and the Treasury Bill rate, thus excluding the section already rep-
resented by LIBOR-OIS. The spread between OIS and the Treasury Bill rate is
the spread that is the clearest possible indicator of liquidity issues because the
OIS rate is the rate for almost fully collateralized private transactions and the
11Our results and conclusions are robust to other ltering techniques, such as the HP lter,
10- and 20-day moving averages etc.
12For example, Hu (2007) reports that for CDOs issued in 2006, AAA-rated assets accounted
for 85% of dollar value and 36% of the number of tranches, while the gures for Baa and lower
rated assets were 3.7% and 24% respectively. Many deals had more than one AAA tranche.
The ABX index is based on the most subordinate AAA tranche.
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Table 3:
Correlation coe¢ cients for factors with observed variables.
factor Libor-OIS OIS-Tbill VIX REIT REIT
Panel A: Correlations
common wt -0.1916 -0.1004 -0.2149 0.1530 0.3625
vint 06-1 v06 1;t 0.0544 -0.0106 0.0163 -0.0279 -0.0114
vint 07-1 v07 1;t 0.1610 0.1483 0.2078 -0.1566 -0.1443
vint 07-2 v07 2;t -0.1690 -0.2399 -0.2265 0.2550 0.0606
AAA rated kAAA;t -0.0984 -0.0900 -0.0932 0.0649 0.0598
AA rated kAA;t -0.0419 0.0118 -0.0061 0.0302 0.0437
BBB rated kBBB;t -0.0379 0.0295 0.0007 -0.1266 -0.0342
Treasury Bill rate is a nominal risk free rate. General nancial market volatility
is measured by the VIX index. The VIX index is a forward-looking variable
which reects expectations of stock market volatility over the next 30 days.
Figure 7 presents the observed factors employed in our analysis.
The correlation coe¢ cients for each of the factors with the observed variables
are reported in Table 3.13
The common factor for the ABX index is most highly correlated with the
value of housing. The correlation of the rate of change of the REIT index
with the common factor is 36 percent, which we think is fairly substantial for
daily data.The common factor is also correlated with the VIX, at 21 percent,
suggesting a reection of the general increase in nancial turmoil through out
the period. Both counterparty and liquidity risk are reected in the common
factor with around 20 percent correlations with each of the interest rate spreads.
While each of these observed variables is somewhat correlated with the common
factor, there is substantially more to be explained. The common factor is picking
up other (possible unobservable) common inuences such as changes in investor
perception of asset quality, reassessment of the risk of these assets, as well as
potentially changing weights on di¤erent variables over time. This latter points
particularly to the lack of success of xed weight regression analysis in this
arena.
A similar analysis is applied to the vintage factors, which as they are orthog-
onal to the common factor, reect developments common to particular vintages
additional to the overall common e¤ects. The vintage factors show a wide range
of correlation behaviour with the observable variables. For example, the 06-1 vin-
tage exhibits very little correlation with the observed variables. Interestingly,
the degree of correlation with the observed variables increases with vintage.
13The strong correlations between all these indices e¤ectively prohibits a meaningful mul-
tivariate regression analysis of these relationships.
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This suggests that the tranches of later vintages have more common develop-
ments than the earliest vintage. All of the observed variables exert an excess
inuence on the return behavior of these later-initiated assets. In particular,
the REIT index is important, consistent with the argument that the underlying
pool of mortgages was of changing quality over time. Likewise, tightening in
liquidity, increasing counterparty risk and the expectation of persistent nan-
cial market volatility impact upon these assets. The main conclusion drawn
from this analysis is that both observed and unobserved drivers imply that the
vintages issued in 2007 were of poorer quality and more risky than the issue of
2006.
Finally, we focus on the ratings factors. The results show little or no excess
inuence on the di¤erent tranches across vintages over and above that captured
by the common factor. All ratings factors exhibit low correlation with the
observable assets. This is consistent with the proposition that the common
shock blurred the boundaries between di¤erent asset tranches, with common
risk sources across all ratings.
In summary, the common shock incorporates observed factors, such as con-
ditions in the underlying real estate market; general nancial market volatility;
and liquidity and counterparty risk in credit derivative markets. However, there
is also a major component of the common factor attributable to other, poten-
tially unobservable, factors including changes in the attitude of investors to
subprime mortgage backed assets. The re-evaluation of these CDO instruments
is an important feature of the return generating process, and its progress is ev-
ident in the factors. In general, the common factor subsumes all others and we
nd little di¤erentiation by rating. All assets of a similar rating exhibit little
excess reaction to the observable variables. Vintage factors matter more. These
di¤erentiate the issuances of assets and indicate that later vintages exhibit in-
creased sensitivity to the level of real estate prices, volatility and liquidity. None
of the factors other than the common factor has a high correlation with the ob-
served variables, which demonstrates the di¢ culty of attributing the common
changes in asset behaviour to individual observed indicators. The situation dis-
plays far more complexity than simple observed variables can replicate - and
latent factors which can take into account observed and unobserved inuences
as well as potentially changing weights on those components provide a uesful
means of approaching this decomposition.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis focuses on the characterization of indices of subprime mortgage
backed assets during the unfolding of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. In par-
ticular, we seek to gain a better understanding of the sources of the decline
of this market, for example via liquidity and counterparty risk. To do so, we
apply a latent factor model to an unbalanced panel of tranched asset returns.
In this case, the unbalanced nature of the data allows identication of four
factors from the returns; a common factor, a vintage factor relating to the is-
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suance dates of the asset, a credit rating factor and an idiosyncratic factor. All
factors exert a time-varying inuence on the volatility of asset returns. The
factor common to all tranches and vintages of indices exhibits the most im-
portant change in variation over time. Before July 2007, the common factors
inuence is negligible. This is consistent with market participants underpricing,
and credit agencies underestimating, the coming nancial di¢ culties. (This of
course is easier to see now.) Given the structure of CDOs, the most senior
tranches are quite vulnerable to the miscalculation of asset risk. The increas-
ing magnitude of common undiversiable shocks changes the return behavior of
AAA tranches dramatically as the crisis unfolds. In addition, the demarcation
between tranches becomes blurred as assets within the underlying pool becom-
ing increasingly correlated. Consequently, it is the common shock that is most
closely associated with the main damage to the values of CDOs. As suggested
by Coval, Jubek and Sta¤ord (2009), the securitization process led to more vul-
nerability to common risk that had been unimportant during the low volatility
environment before 2007, but came to the fore with a vengeance during the sub-
sequent downturn. At the other end of the spectrum, the role of idiosyncratic
shocks in determining asset returns is predominantly associated with the lowest
rated tranche, but even this is largely overwhelmed by the common factor after
July 2007. Similarly, in the earlier tranquil market conditions, both the ratings
and vintage factors are important for some tranches but again their inuence is
dwarfed by the common factor during the nancial crisis.
Given its prevalence and its e¤ects on the largest segment of the market 
the AAA-rated tranches we delve deeper into the origins of the common shock.
Specically, we relate the extracted common shock to a range of observable vari-
ables that are commonly cited as being crucial in the initiation and transmission
of the crisis. Variables that capture the real estate downturn, general nancial
market volatility, market liquidity shortages and increasing counterparty risk are
all related to the common factor responsible for the downturn in asset backed
security performance. However, our latent factor approach captures two impor-
tant features of the crisis. First, the relationship with fundamentalfactors is
likely to be time-varying. Second, unobserved sources of commonality, such as
changes in investor perception of risk and appetite for these assets, were also
important determinants of the demise of this market.
Further analysis of our latent factors reveals an important characteristic of
CDOs. The structured product is only as good as the quality of the underlying
asset. While the ratings factors are largely unrelated to our observed variables,
the vintage factors reect asset di¤erentiation. As the quality of the underlying
mortgages deteriorated due to conditions in the real estate sector and less strin-
gent underwriting standards, the vintage factor becomes more correlated with
observables.
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Appendix: Details on Data Series
The data series used in this paper are described below:
ABX Data:
 ABX.HE-A 06-1: 0.54% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AFAA7
 ABX.HE-A 07-1: 0.64% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AFAC0
 ABX.HE-A 07-2: 3.69% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AFAD8
 ABX.HE-AAA 06-1: 0.18% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AHAA1
 ABX.HE-AAA 07-1: 0.09% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AHAC6
 ABX.HE-AAA 07-2: 0.76% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AHAD4
 ABX.HE-BBB 06-1: 1.54% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AIAB6
 ABX.HE-BBB 07-1: 2.24% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AIAC4
 ABX.HE-BBB 07-2: 5.00% Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AIAD2
Other series:
 US Real estate sector price index - Datastream code: DJAREIT
 VIX: CBOE Market volatility index
 Interest rates: 3-month LIBOR; OIS rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate
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Figure 1: Growth of ABS market
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Figure 2: ABX price indices by vintage
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Figure 3. Results for ABX indices originated in Jan 06
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Figure 4. Results for ABX indices originated in Jan 07
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Figure 5. Results for ABX indices originated in July 07
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Figure 6. Extracted and filtered factors 
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Figure 7. Observable economic variables used in analysis 
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